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Abstract
Euroscepticism is increasingly important to the shaping and understanding of contemporary
European public opinion and politics. The origins of the trait, however, particularly the values that pre-
dispose individuals to view the European Union (EU) as a legitimate (or otherwise) political institution,
remain poorly understood. Literature on political socialization identifies the family as a vital influence
on the development of many social and political attitudes. This study explores the role of the family in
the development of Euroscepticism by examining evidence of intergenerational transmission of hos-
tility towards membership of the EU between parents and children in the United Kingdom during its
‘Brexit referendum’. The study shows that the attitudes of parents during one’s politically formative
years can be an important factor in shaping support for EU membership. It also finds that this inter-
generational transmission is different for mothers and fathers: while there is a greater likelihood of a
child’s attitudes being affected by those of their father, if they are affected by their mother’s views
they are more likely to eventually share their mother’s position on EU membership. This identifies the
family as a key source of the values that shape support for European integration, potentially accelerat-
ing or opposing other social trends that have resulted in successive generations typically being more
supportive of EU membership.
Introduction
Euroscepticism—that is, hostility towards European
Union (EU) membership and/or integration—has be-
come increasingly significant in shaping European pub-
lic opinion and politics over the last decade. The
financial and Euro crises of 2007/8, and ‘refugee crisis’
of 2012, in particular, have raised the salience of debates
regarding the costs and benefits of EU membership for
European citizens. Euroscepticism can also be seen as
a response to the increasing impact of EU membership
(i.e. further integration, globalization, increased
migration, and technological development) on political
issues traditionally shaped by citizens’ core political and
social values, such as understandings of national identity
and state sovereignty, attitudes towards cultural change,
and perceptions of the role of the state in relation to
citizens and the economy (McLaren, 2002; Hooghe and
Marks, 2005; Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Hobolt, 2016,
2018). The growing popularity of political parties
that blend hostility towards the EU with scepticism to-
wards mass migration, cultural change and open market
economies (such as Lega Nord, the Front Nationale or
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Fidesz), and the successful ‘leave’ campaign in the
United Kingdom’s (UK) referendum on EU membership
in 2016 (Clarke et al., 2017; Hobolt, 2018), are but the
latest indications of the rising importance of these issues
and their relationship with Euroscepticism.
Understanding the origins of Euroscepticism is, there-
fore, increasingly salient for contextualizing contem-
porary public opinion and electoral politics in Europe.
Previous research has shown that Euroscepticism reflects
both short-term utilitarian assessments about the costs
and benefits of EU integration, and more deeply-held
affective values regarding the perceived legitimacy of the
EU and its use of power, which originate in the early years
of socialization (Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Down and
Wilson, 2017). This means that key influences during so-
cialization—such as the family—have considerable
potential to shape the way individuals view and assess the
legitimacy of the EU’s power over their lives and commu-
nity (Hyman, 1959; Jennings and Niemi, 1968, 1981;
Plutzer, 2002; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009;
Quintelier, Verhaegen and Hooghe, 2014). It is possible,
therefore, for beliefs and values that shape Euroscepticism
to be ‘transmitted’ from parents to their children during
the socialization process, identifying the family as a po-
tentially key source of support for (or opposition to-
wards) EU integration. The scope of this potential is,
however, poorly understood, as is the extent to which the
transmission of values that underpin affective support for
or opposition to the EU from parents to children can per-
sist and still be apparent, or whether they can be overrid-
den entirely, by shorter-term utilitarian assessments.
Research on how socialization (and socializing
agents) affect citizens’ views of the EU is limited.
Previous studies have examined how the broader
political climate and historic development of European
integration affects Euroscepticism (Down and Wilson,
2013, 2017; Fox and Pearce, 2018), and considered
how familial influence is related to the development of
‘European’ identity (Quintelier, Verhaegen and Hooghe,
2014). The role of the family in shaping an individual’s
propensity to view the EU as a legitimate and valued
institution, however, remains largely unstudied. This
study addresses this deficiency and examines how
intergenerational transmission—between parents and
their children—is related to the development of
Euroscepticism, using the opportunity presented by the
United Kingdom’s ‘Brexit’ referendum. Using the UK
Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS), it examines
the relationship between individuals’ support for leaving
the EU, and the attitudes expressed by their parents dur-
ing the ‘formative years’ of their political socialization.
It also considers how the transmission of Euroscepticism
may vary between mothers and fathers, and how the im-
pact of parents’ attitudes could differ as a reflection of
their political characteristics and different household
roles.
The study finds evidence of intergenerational trans-
mission, with some citizens being disproportionately
likely to share the Euroscepticism expressed by their
parents during their formative years and to support
Brexit, despite being in an age group dominated by hos-
tility towards the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from
the EU. Only a minority of respondents exhibit such a
replication of ‘hard Euroscepticism’, however (i.e. the
view that the United Kingdom should leave the EU
[Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007]). This is partly due to the
fact that, while the United Kingdom is a largely
Eurosceptic country, only a minority of parents within
our sample held such passionately Eurosceptic beliefs
during their children’s socialization to the extent that
they were clearly transmitted and replicated in their off-
spring. We also find that transmission varies between
parents: maternal influence seems more dependent on
mothers’ level of engagement with politics when com-
pared with paternal influence (and a sizeable minority of
women have little interest in politics in the United
Kingdom). That said, transmission from mothers is po-
tentially stronger, with passionately Eurosceptic and
politically engaged mothers being more likely to instil
Euroscepticism in their children than similar fathers.
The study concludes, therefore, that while social change
generally means younger generations are less
Eurosceptic than older generations (Down and Wilson,
2013, 2017; Fox and Pearce, 2018), a citizens’ propen-
sity to support EU membership is, to varying degrees,
likely to be shaped by the attitudes and values of their
parents. This means that the family can foster particular
views towards the EU, even to the extent of acting as a
buffer against the pro-EU tendencies promoted by social
change. This suggests that deep-rooted experiences of
previous political contexts are continuing to shape
European public opinion regarding EU membership, na-
tional identity, the role of the state, mass migration, and
globalization.
The Intergenerational Transmission of
Political and Social Characteristics
The family is widely regarded as a key socializing agent,
with parents, in particular, playing a pivotal role in pro-
viding their children with a framework for interpreting
and traversing the social world. In political science the
influence of parents is often said to be concentrated dur-
ing the ‘formative years’ of adolescence, when children
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first begin to engage with and develop an awareness of
politics (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009). The mech-
anism by which this influence is realized is described as
social learning, whereby children receive cues about
how to respond to political stimuli through ‘observa-
tional learning, modelling, imitation and identification’
(Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009: p. 783). From a
sociological perspective, it is argued that these explicit
processes of political socialization are underpinned by
more generalized, tacit and unconscious processes of pri-
mary domestic socialization in the family home
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1986; Moore, 2004). From this per-
spective, exposure to particular beliefs and values earlier
in a person’s life acts to frame their subsequent under-
standing and interpretation of political issues.
Factors Influencing Intergenerational
Transmission
Research on social learning indicates that the likelihood
of a particular characteristic being transmitted from par-
ent to child is influenced by two factors: (1) the strength
and consistency of cue giving, and (2) the nature of the
trait. Traits that are of greater salience to the parent(s),
(for example, an issue they feel passionate about) are
more likely to be transmitted because there will be more
consistent and clear cue giving (Jennings and Niemi,
1968; Tedin, 1974; Dinas, 2013; Quintelier, Verhaegen
and Hooghe, 2014; Meeusen, 2014). According to
this logic, a parent who is engaged with politics and a
passionate advocate of membership of the EU, for ex-
ample, is more likely to consistently and clearly express
pro-EU sentiments than a parent who is not interested in
politics and/or has no clear view on EU membership.
Consequently, the offspring of the former are more like-
ly to receive cues that influence the development of their
attitudes than the offspring of the latter.
There is also typically a greater parent-child similar-
ity in traits that are particularly value-laden or affec-
tively oriented (such as ideological or moral beliefs),
compared to those that are more utilitarian in nature
(Hess and Torney, 1965; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers,
2009; Rico and Jennings, 2012; Dinas, 2013). For ex-
ample, the greatest congruence between the parents and
children studied by Jennings, Stoker and Bowers (2009)
was for partisan political beliefs, which tend to hinge on
citizens’ moral and ideological values. Indeed, the suc-
cessful transmission of other attitudes or beliefs
depended on how strong a moral or affective component
they had. This research suggests that the fact that moral
or affective beliefs tend to be stable, unchanging, and
frequently expressed, means that parents will provide
their children with numerous consistent cues that in-
crease the likelihood of transmission (Jennings, Stoker
and Bowers, 2009).
Transmission can also vary between parents.
Quintelier, Verhaegen and Hooghe (2014) found that
the development of European identity was more strongly
influenced by interaction with mothers than fathers.
This could be due to gendered (rather than specifically
parental) characteristics—such as men being more inter-
ested in politics than women, meaning that transmission
is more likely to come from fathers than mothers. It
could also reflect differences in mother–child and
father–child relationships (Korupp, Ganzeboom and
Van der Lippe, 2002; Flouri and Buchanan, 2004;
Jaspers, Lubbers and De Vries, 2008; Jennings, Stoker
and Bowers, 2009; Quintelier, Verhaegen and Hooghe,
2014; Quintelier, 2015). For example, Jennings and
Langton (1969) found that children are more likely to
be influenced by the values of the parent to whom they
feel closest. Traditionally, mothers and fathers have
occupied different household roles, with mothers more
likely to be central to family politics and having closer
emotional ties to their children, arguably resulting in a
greater likelihood of transmission (Zuckerman et al.,
2007; Coffe and Voorpostel, 2011).
The Intergenerational Transmission of
Euroscepticism
Existing research indicates that there is a clear potential
for a trait rooted in affective values and orientations
to be expressed consistently by parents during the early
years of their children’s political socialization, to the
extent that it can shape their children’s subsequent
political values, attitudes and behaviours in adulthood.
Previous scholarship has highlighted the multi-
dimensional nature of Euroscepticism—identifying it
as a potential reflection of not only short-term assess-
ments of whether EU membership is good for one’s
country or community, but also more deeply held,
longer-term social and political values and priorities
(Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Boomgaarden et al.,
2011). This affective dimension of Euroscepticism links
to individual beliefs about the legitimacy of the EU as a
political institution and the political values it embodies:
international cooperation, pooled sovereignty, inter-
national governance, and cross-border citizenship.
It is also shaped by broader political and social values
related to conceptions of national identity and state
sovereignty, views of cultural identity, the impact of
migration and social change, and the role of the state
and government in the economy and daily life
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(McLaren, 2002; Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Ford and
Goodwin, 2014; Hobolt, 2016; 2018).
To the extent that Euroscepticism reflects affective
sentiments regarding the EU and related socio-political
values, it can be heavily influenced, therefore, by the
political values and beliefs of parents during socializa-
tion. The importance of socialization in the development
of Euroscepticism is underlined by studies of generation-
al trends showing that people growing up in different so-
cial, economic, and political contexts (defined, for
example, by different stages of European integration)
have different likelihoods of being Eurosceptic that last
throughout their lives (Down and Wilson, 2013; 2017;
Fox and Pearce, 2018). Similarly, Quintelier, Verhaegen
and Hooghe (2014) found that parents had an important
influence on their children’s views on national and
European identity, and that this could vary depending
on the strength of identity held by mothers and fathers.
There has been no study of how familial socialization is
related to the development of the affective dimension of
Euroscepticism, however. While holding or rejecting a
European identity is likely to be related to an individu-
al’s views of EU membership, the two are quite different
concepts. European identity refers to ‘a specific form of
social identity, expressed as a feeling of belonging to the
European Union’ (Quintelier, Verhaegen and Hooghe,
2014: p. 1104) and focusses primarily on how an indi-
vidual considers themselves to be associated with—and
brings meaning to their relationship with—a wider soci-
ety or group. Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is a
political attitude that reflects an individual’s support (or
otherwise) for a particular use, distribution or manifest-
ation of political power, in this case through their coun-
try’s relationship with the EU and other European
countries. The differences between the traits may also
mean that processes of socialization and intergenera-
tional transmission operate differently, or are influenced
differently by mediating factors such as political engage-
ment and the parent in question.
Research Design
This study uses the UKHLS, a household panel study of
the United Kingdom population with data on a wide
range of social, political, and economic traits, including
Euroscepticism and respondents’ preferences during the
2016 ‘Brexit referendum’. The survey includes a long
running panel (with some respondents recruited in
1991), and recruits respondents’ children when they
turn 16. It also allows parent-child relationships to
be identified. This means that expressions of
Euroscepticism among respondents in recent waves can
be matched with the Euroscepticism of their parents in
earlier waves, to approximate the effect of respondents’
parents’ attitudes expressed during their formative years
on their attitudes in later life. This panel design makes
this the only study to date that enables the examination
of the intergenerational transmission of traits related to
the EU that takes account of how their expression in
later life is related to attitudes respondents’ were
exposed to during their formative years.
The United Kingdom is not, of course, expected to be
representative of public opinion throughout the EU, and
even less so during a rare referendum on EU member-
ship. The lack of appropriate cross-national data makes
dependence on a single country instance unavoidable.
The United Kingdom does provide a good case in which
to look for evidence of intergenerational transmission,
however, not least because of the unique opportunity to
study the process using UKHLS panel data. Moreover,
the United Kingdom is consistently identified as one of
the most Eurosceptic Member States, meaning that if
evidence of the intergenerational transmission of
Euroscepticism can be found anywhere in the EU, it
should be in the United Kingdom (Gabel, 1998; Nelsen,
Guth and Fraser, 2001; Hooghe and Marks, 2005).
There is also little reason to think that the specific con-
text of the United Kingdom, or of its 2016 referendum,
should alter the processes of intergenerational transmis-
sion or familial socialization to the extent that general-
izations are impossible. Generalizing from the United
Kingdom can also be justified on the basis that
Euroscepticism is consistently shown to follow similar
trends, and to be associated with similar characteristics
and circumstances, throughout the EU (Gabel, 1998;
Nelsen, Guth and Fraser, 2001; Hooghe and Marks,
2005). While a clear avenue for further research is to
confirm this, this study assumes that the United
Kingdom provides an appropriate example of an EU
Member State in which to study the intergenerational
transmission of Euroscepticism.
Questions about EU membership are infrequent in
the UKHLS, meaning that only a few waves are avail-
able for this analysis and so a straight-forward opera-
tionalization of intergenerational transmission must be
used. Respondents’ preferences in the United Kingdom’s
referendum on EU membership in 2016 were matched
with the responses of their parents to a series of ques-
tions about EU membership in 2006 i.e. during an ear-
lier stage of their political socialization. It is not
expected that parents’ attitudes in 2006 will be wholly
representative of their views of the EU, nor that there
would be no change at all in the expression or intensity
of that view over time. The fact that Euroscepticism is
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widely regarded to be a relatively stable trait amongst
adults, however, suggests that using the 2006 data as an
indication of whether respondents’ were exposed to par-
ticularly Eurosceptic attitudes during their formative
years is appropriate (Lubbers and Jaspers, 2010; Down
and Wilson, 2013, 2017; Fox and Pearce, 2018).1
Moreover, if there is any instability in parents’ expres-
sion of Euroscepticism, this actually strengthens the test
of whether intergenerational transmission is occurring,
because unstable attitudes are less likely to be transmit-
ted (Jennings and Niemi, 1968, 1981).
We infer intergenerational transmission based on
congruence between the attitudes of respondents in the
2016 referendum and those of their parents in the 2006
survey (when controlling for other factors). Specifically,
respondents who supported the United Kingdom leaving
the EU in 2016, and whose parents were extremely crit-
ical of the EU and supported leaving it in 2006, are
taken to indicate the intergenerational transmission of
hard Euroscepticism. This does not capture, therefore,
all of the possible expressions of Euroscepticism that
could reflect parental influence; rather, it captures the
most ‘extreme’ manifestation of that influence in the
form of replication of the parents’ attitudes, and only
with regard to support for Brexit. The constraints of the
data available in the UKHLS, therefore, mean that the
analysis is highly likely to produce a conservative esti-
mate of the extent of intergenerational transmission. In
addition, this method does not account for reverse caus-
ation i.e. the view of respondents’ influencing the
Euroscepticism of their parents in 2006. Instances of re-
verse causation are unlikely, however, because (by virtue
of their age) the respondents were unlikely to have par-
ticularly developed views of EU membership compared
to their parents, who are more likely to have more estab-
lished and stable views that are less receptive to external
influence (Dinas, 2013). Moreover, this analysis
focusses on convergence of hard Euroscepticism be-
tween parents and children as evidence of intergenera-
tional transmission; previous research has shown that
the majority of external or socialization influences that
may affect the attitudes of the children, such as complet-
ing higher education, are if anything likely to make
them more supportive of the EU. By focussing on a rare
form of transmission (i.e. exact convergence of atti-
tudes), and one which has to overcome the opposing in-
fluence of secondary socialization agents and
experiences, any reverse causation (which cannot be en-
tirely ruled out) is highly unlikely to undermine the val-
idity of this conservative analysis. Finally, this approach
does not look to identify the potential causes of the
parents’ Euroscepticism that they may share with their
children (such as financial precarity); rather, it focusses
on establishing evidence that growing up in a
Eurosceptic household increases the likelihood of the
child being Eurosceptic in later life after controlling for
such potential causes of Euroscepticism.
Sample
The sample is limited to respondents who: (a) answered
the UKHLS question about the EU referendum in 2016;
(b) were aged under thirty in 2006 (indicating that they
were still in their ‘politically formative’ years); and (c)
for whom there is data on either their mother’s or
father’s Euroscepticism in 2006. The influence of
parents’ attitudes are analyzed separately (though the
potential for interactions between them are explored) as
limiting the sample to those for whom data from both
their mothers and fathers is available in 2006 would ren-
der it too small to sustain reliable analyses. This results
in an effective sample of 1,179 respondents.
The definition of the formative years of political so-
cialization (during which respondents should be most re-
ceptive to the attitudes of their parents) of under the age
of 30 is different from the more commonly used defin-
ition of between the ages of 15 and 25 in political sci-
ence; a definition we argue is problematic. It is based on
an assumption that political awareness and interest do
not begin to form until age 15—a claim that is under-
mined by studies of children showing political awareness
as early as the pre-teen years (Jennings and Niemi, 1968;
Van Deth, Abendschon and Vollmar, 2011). Indeed,
Bartels and Jackman (2014) found evidence of political
learning in children as young as age 7. Sociological con-
ceptualizations of familial socialization and habitus de-
velopment (Bourdieu, 1977, 1986) also imply a process
beginning much earlier than adolescence. Similarly, stip-
ulating that formative political socialization stops at age
25 is equally problematic in light of growing evidence of
the protraction of the ‘youth’ stage of the political life-
cycle (Flanagan et al., 2012; Smets, 2016). Economic
and social changes mean that it takes longer for young
people to achieve the markers of ‘adulthood’ associated
with becoming independent citizens (i.e. economic inde-
pendence, completing full-time education, entering the
labour market, buying a home and starting a family).
Many of the experiences associated with such status do
not occur until a later age, meaning the period during
which young people seek guidance on how to respond to
political stimuli from socializing agents— including
parents— is likely to be longer. In accordance with this
literature, a broader age range is used to define the for-
mative years that takes account of both the earlier age at
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which political learning begins, and the later age at
which it becomes more limited.
Measures and Hypothesis
The central hypothesis is that respondents (Generation
2; ‘G2’) whose parents (Generation 1; ‘G1’) held strong-
ly Eurosceptic attitudes during their formative years
would be more likely to share that Euroscepticism in
later life. As outlined above, however, this should be
moderated by the salience of politics and EU member-
ship to the parents during those formative years: the
more politically interested the mother or father, the
more salient politics and issues such as EU membership
were likely to be during the formative years of the child,
and so the greater the likelihood of intergenerational
transmission. While the analysis allows for different
effects from G1 mothers and fathers, no specific mother
or father effects are hypothesized because (as shown
above) the existing literature is divided as to what
expectations of those effects might be.
The hypothesis was tested using logistic regression
analysis. The dependent variable was derived from the
question ‘Should the UK remain a member of the
European Union?’ in the 2016 data. G2 respondents
who supported ‘leave’ received a score of ‘1’ and those
who responded ‘remain’ or ‘don’t know’ received a ‘0’.
Three independent variables were used to operationalize
social learning, based on measures of the parents’
Euroscepticism and interest in politics. In the 2006 sur-
vey, G1 respondents were asked three questions about
the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU: (1)
whether they thought EU membership was ‘good’, ‘bad’,
or ‘neither good nor bad’; (2) whether the United
Kingdom had benefitted from membership; and (3)
what the United Kingdom’s long term policy towards
membership should be. Latent structure analysis (see
Supplementary Appendix) confirmed that all three vari-
ables were indicative of a common latent trait, and so
responses to these questions were summarized so that
parents who gave ‘hard’ Eurosceptic responses to each
were identified as being ‘Eurosceptic’ and given a score
of ‘1’ (i.e. they said that EU membership was bad for the
United Kingdom, that the United Kingdom had not ben-
efitted, and that the United Kingdom should reduce the
EU’s power or leave altogether). Parents who did not
give all ‘hard’ Eurosceptic responses were given a score
of ‘0’. The salience of politics (and by association
Euroscepticism) to the parents was measured by their
interest in politics in 2006: those who were ‘not at all
interested’ or ‘not very interested’ in politics were identi-
fied as having low engagement (and given a score of ‘0’),
and those who were ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ interested were
identified as having higher engagement (with a score of
‘1’).2 An interaction variable between each parents’
Euroscepticism and political interest was also created, to
reflect the expectation that the transmission of
Euroscepticism should be dependent upon the latter. A
further interaction between mothers’ and fathers’
Euroscepticism was also included, to see if the effect of
one parents’ attitudes was affected in some way by the
attitudes of the other.
Finally, control variables representing respondents’
traits related to Euroscepticism and support for Brexit in
the literature were also included, to isolate the effect of
the parents’ attitudes as far as possible, including: age,
marital status and gender; education; interest in politics;
occupational social class; religious affiliation; trade
union membership; political party support; region; and
whether or not respondents reported that they were
struggling financially (Gabel, 1998; Nelsen, Guth and
Fraser, 2001; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Down and
Wilson, 2013; Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley, 2017;
Curtice 2017; Fox and Pearce, 2018).3
Results
While the majority of G2 respondents (64 per cent) sup-
ported ‘remain’ in the referendum (unsurprisingly as
they were all under 40, the age group most likely to op-
pose Brexit), the descriptive statistics support the hy-
pothesis that those with hard Eurosceptic parents were
more likely to support leaving the EU. Of those whose
mothers were Eurosceptic during their formative years,
45 per cent supported remaining in the EU while 49 per
cent wanted to leave; of those whose mothers were not
Eurosceptic, the figures were 64 per cent and 33 per cent
respectively. Similarly, of those who had hard
Eurosceptic fathers, 53 per cent supported remaining in
the EU and 43 per cent supported leaving. For those
whose fathers were not Eurosceptic, 62 per cent sup-
ported remain and 35 per cent supported Brexit.
There was also evidence that this relationship varied
depending on the parents’ political engagement, and
that it differed for mothers and fathers. Figure 1 shows
the proportion of respondents who supported ‘remain’
or ‘leave’ depending on the Euroscepticism and degree
of political engagement of their mothers and fathers in
2006. It also shows the proportion of respondents in
each category of mothers/fathers Euroscepticism by pol-
itical engagement. Of those who had hard Eurosceptic
mothers who were highly engaged with politics (8 per
cent of our sample), just over half supported leaving the
EU, compared with 47 per cent of those with hard
6 European Sociological Review, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0
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Eurosceptic but not highly engaged mothers. The inverse
of this group—those with not hard Eurosceptic but also
highly engaged mothers (whom we would expect to be
disproportionately likely to support ‘remain’)—also
responded as expected, with 28 per cent supporting leav-
ing the EU and 71 per cent supporting remaining. The
likelihood of mothers’ attitudes being transmitted to
their children seems higher, therefore, if she was inter-
ested in politics.
For fathers, however, the effects of their attitudes to-
wards the EU and interest in politics appear to work
against each other. Of those with hard Eurosceptic and
highly engaged fathers (10 per cent of the sample), 39
per cent supported Brexit, compared with 47 per cent of
those with hard Eurosceptic but not highly engaged
fathers. The pattern for fathers who were not hard
Eurosceptics was essentially the same as for mothers.
Previous research has shown that higher levels of polit-
ical engagement are associated with greater support for
EU membership (Gabel, 1998); this data suggests, there-
fore, that respondents’ fathers were transmitting charac-
teristics that made their offspring more likely to be pro-
EU if they were highly engaged with politics, even if
they themselves were actually strongly Eurosceptic.
Table 1 presents the results of eight logistic regres-
sion models predicting a ‘leave’ vote in the referendum.
For the sake of brevity, only statistics relating to parents’
Euroscepticism and model fit are reported—the full out-
puts are in the Supplementary Appendix. The first model
included only control variables; the second included
mothers’ Euroscepticism and political interest without
controls, while the third included the interaction be-
tween the two; the fourth and fifth models showed the
same outputs for fathers; the sixth and seventh showed
those outputs for both parents together; and the eighth
model included the data for mothers and fathers (though
the interaction for fathers was omitted as it was not sig-
nificant) with all of the control variables.
Model II showed that both mothers’ Euroscepticism
and political interest had the anticipated effects: a re-
spondent whose mother was a hard Eurosceptic during
their formative years was roughly 17 percentage points
more likely to support Brexit than one whose mother
was more supportive of the EU. Respondents with a
highly engaged mother were around 9 points less likely
to support Brexit than those with a less engaged mother.
The two also interacted: the positive, significant inter-
action coefficient in Model III shows that if a mother
was highly engaged it increased the likelihood of her
Euroscepticism being reproduced in her children.
Respondents with a hard Eurosceptic, highly engaged
mother had a 52 per cent probability of supporting
‘leave’, while those with a not-Eurosceptic, highly
engaged mother had a 24 per cent probability of doing
so. Model IV showed that having a hard Eurosceptic
and/or highly engaged father had a similar effect:
respondents with a hard Eurosceptic father were roughly
10 points more likely to support Brexit, and those with a
highly engaged father were 12 points less likely to do so.
Model V showed, however, that there was no
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Low
Engagement
(58%)
High
Engagement
(21%)
Low
Engagement
(13%)
High
Engagement
(8%)
Low
Engagement
(52%)
High
Engagement
(28%)
Low
Engagement
(9%)
High
Engagement
(10%)
Not Hard E/S Mum Hard E/S Mum Not Hard E/S Dad Hard E/S Dad
Remain Leave
Figure 1. Support for Brexit by Euroscepticism (E/S) & political interest of parents.
Source: UKHLS. The percentages in brackets show the proportion of respondents that fit into each category of mother/father’s Euroscepticism by political
engagement. Obs: 1, 179.
European Sociological Review, 2019, Vol. 0, No. 0 7
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/esr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/esr/jcz005/5359475 by C
ardiff U
niversity user on 22 M
arch 2019
interaction between these two traits as there was for
mothers.
When the effects of mothers and fathers were consid-
ered together (Model VI), they remained virtually the
same, suggesting that the impact of mothers’ and
fathers’ attitudes were largely independent. This is sup-
ported by the inclusion of an interaction variable (not
reported) between mothers’ and fathers’ Euroscepticism,
which was far from significant and had a negligible ef-
fect. As shown in previous models, indications of hard
Euroscepticism amongst mothers and fathers increased
the chances of their offspring supporting leaving the EU,
while high levels of political engagement amongst moth-
ers and fathers increased the chances of their offspring
Table 1. Logistic regression results, likelihood of voting ‘Leave’ in 2016
Model I: Control Model II:
Mother only
Model III: Mother
only with interaction
Model IV: Father only
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er
Mother’s Euroscepticism &
Engagement
Hard Eurosceptic 0.72‡ 0.15 0.43* 0.19
Fairly/Very interested in
politics
0.41† 0.14 0.61‡ 0.16
Interaction 0.80* 0.32
Father’s Euroscepticism &
Engagement
Hard Eurosceptic 0.43† 0.16
Fairly/Very interested in
politics
0.55‡ 0.13
Interaction
Constant 1.22† 0.38 0.60‡ 0.08 0.55‡ 0.08 0.47‡ 0.08
Pseudo r2 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.01
Akaike Information Criterion 1381 1519 1515 1525
Bayesian Information Criterion 1584 1534 1535 1540
Model V: Father
only with
interaction
Model VI: Both
parents
Model VII: Both
parents with
interaction
Model VIII: Full
Model
Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er Coef Std Er
Mother’s Euroscepticism &
Engagement
Hard Eurosceptic 0.69‡ 0.16 0.41* 0.19 0.13 0.22
Fairly/Very interested in
politics
0.36† 0.14 0.56‡ 0.17 0.50† 0.19
Interaction 0.76* 0.32 1.00† 0.36
Father’s Euroscepticism &
Engagement
Hard Eurosceptic 0.25 0.21 0.34* 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.33^ 0.18
Fairly/Very interested in
politics
0.65‡ 0.15 0.53‡ 0.13 0.60‡ 0.13 0.40† 0.16
Interaction 0.42 0.32 0.37 0.33
Constant 0.44‡ 0.08 0.49‡ 0.09 0.42‡ 0.09 1.10† 0.40
Pseudo r2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.17
Akaike Information Criterion 1525 1508 1502 1364
Bayesian Information Criterion 1545 1530 1537 1592
Source: UKHLS. Obs: 1, 179.
^—coefficient statistically significant at 90% confidence level;
*—at 95%; †—at 99%; ‡—at 99.9%.
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opposing it. Model VI showed, however, that the effect
of the mothers’ Euroscepticism was roughly twice as
strong as that of fathers’, while the effect of fathers’ pol-
itical engagement was slightly stronger than that of
mothers’. Respondents with a hard Eurosceptic mother,
for example, were around 16 points more likely to sup-
port Brexit than those with a less Eurosceptic mother,
while for fathers the difference was 7 per cent. Those
with a highly engaged mother, on the other hand, were
shown to be 7 points less likely to support Brexit, com-
pared with a difference of 11 points for fathers.
Model VII included the interaction effects for both
mothers and fathers, and found that the interaction for
mothers was significant and implied the same relation-
ship as shown in Model III. The interaction effect for
fathers was non-significant. The final model (Model
VIII), therefore, included only the interaction for the
mothers, as well as all of the control variables. Including
the controls reduced the magnitude of the coefficients
for mothers and fathers somewhat, but they remained
substantial and highly significant, showing that not only
is the impact of mothers’ and fathers’ attitudes largely
independent from one another, they are largely inde-
pendent of other characteristics and processes affecting
Euroscepticism as well. The only exception was moth-
ers’ Euroscepticism, which no longer had a significant
direct effect; instead, the effect was entirely captured by
the interaction between her Euroscepticism and political
interest.
Figure 2 presents a more readily digestible summary
of this final analysis, showing the predicted probability
(with 95 per cent confidence intervals) of a respondent
supporting Brexit depending on the Euroscepticism and
political engagement of their parents, with controls
accounted for. These data support the argument that
parents’ self-reported Euroscepticism and political en-
gagement affected the likelihood of their children
expressing Eurosceptic values when they were older.
The data also confirm differences between mother-child
and father-child relationships, with the effect of parental
Euroscepticism being stronger for mothers than fathers.
Respondents with a hard Eurosceptic and highly
engaged father, for example, had around a 36 per cent
probability of voting for Brexit; 6 percentage points
higher than those with highly engaged but less
Eurosceptic fathers. The difference for respondents with
hard Eurosceptic, highly engaged mothers and not
Eurosceptic, highly engaged mothers was almost five
times larger (28 per cent). This indicates that for moth-
ers, being highly engaged in politics increased the likeli-
hood of her attitude towards the EU being reproduced
in her children. Conversely, fathers’ views of the EU (if
they were transmitted at all) were likely to be transmit-
ted independently of how interested in politics they
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Figure 2. Predicted probability of voting for Brexit (%). Vertical bars indicate 95 per cent confidence intervals.
Source: UKHLS. Predicted probabilities calculated using Stata 14 ‘margin’ command. Obs: 1, 179
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were: highly engaged fathers transmitted a tendency to
be supportive of EU membership (even if they were
Eurosceptics), while less engaged fathers transmitted a
tendency to be Eurosceptic (even if they were pro-EU).
Discussion
Our analysis provides empirical support for the theory
of intergenerational transmission of Euroscepticism be-
tween parents and children in the United Kingdom: par-
ental views may have led to some respondents being
more likely than their peers to either support or oppose
Brexit in the 2016 referendum. Moreover, the effect of
this transmission was largely independent of other
demographic, socio-economic and political characteris-
tics that lay at the heart of most explanations for
Euroscepticism and the Brexit vote. The central hypoth-
esis of this research and the social learning theory that
underpins it—that having Eurosceptic parents during
one’s formative socialization would result in a greater
propensity to share that Euroscepticism in later life, as
long as that attitude was expressed consistently and
clearly enough by parents—is supported.
Social learning theory would also expect, however,
the likelihood of intergenerational transmission to be
affected by the level of salience that European issues or
values had for parents during the child’s formative years;
to the extent that the salience of EU membership is
reflected in the salience of politics more broadly to the
parents, this was found to be the case only for transmis-
sion from mothers. Fathers’ political engagement had lit-
tle impact on the chances of their Eurosceptic attitudes
being transmitted; rather, it had an independent effect in
which highly engaged fathers produced less Eurosceptic
children regardless of their own Euroscepticism. As the
regression models controlled for the respondents’ level
of political interest, this was not the result of the trans-
mission of political engagement from father to child.
Rather, it is likely to reflect the transmission of an add-
itional trait related to political interest that is not cap-
tured in the model. Moreover, this means that the
potential transmission of Euroscepticism from moth-
ers—the likelihood of which could be increased by her
political engagement—was far stronger (in terms of the
likelihood of resulting in congruence) than that from
fathers. This partially supports another expectation of
social learning theory—that the likelihood of intergen-
erational transmission occurring would be different
for mothers and fathers—though this did not extend
to differences in the relationship between their
Euroscepticism, interest in politics and the chances of
transmission to their children.
The cause of such a considerable difference between
transmissions from mothers and fathers is unclear. It
does not reflect fathers typically being more politically
engaged than mothers; while the data showed that
fathers were typically more engaged, the analyses con-
trolled for parents’ level of political engagement. It is
more likely to reflect either qualitative differences in the
relationships between respondents and their mothers
and fathers, therefore, or the different social, political,
economic, and household roles typically played by
mothers and fathers that lead children to experience
their parents’ political expressions in different ways. A
further possibility is that our findings reflect different
parenting roles, with respondents viewing a political
issue (such as Euroscepticism) when discussed or
expressed by their mother (typically adopting the more
caring and home oriented role) differently from when it
is discussed or expressed by their father (typically adopt-
ing the sterner and more socially or economically ori-
ented role) (Berelson et al., 1954; Collins and Russell,
1991). This uncertainty cannot be resolved by the
UKHLS survey, but poses an interesting question for fu-
ture research, and suggests that the transmission of pol-
itical and social characteristics from parents to children
may be more heavily influenced by parent–child rela-
tionships, household roles or parenting roles than is
often assumed.
While the sample in this research was not represen-
tative of the United Kingdom population, the distribu-
tion of mothers’ and fathers’ attitudes nonetheless
allows for some reflection on the extent to which inter-
generational transmission was likely to result in con-
gruence of Eurosceptic attitudes between generations
in the wider electorate. As reported in Figure 1, roughly
one in five respondents had either a hard Eurosceptic
mother or father, meaning that the vast majority of the
sample were not exposed to Eurosceptic attitudes likely
to make them more Eurosceptic during their formative
years. Given that transmission from mothers is depend-
ent on her also being highly politically engaged, this
reduces the group further: only 8 per cent had hard
Eurosceptic mothers who were also highly engaged.
Overall, around a quarter of our sample had the poten-
tial to replicate the Eurosceptic attitudes of their
parents as a result of intergenerational transmission,
and of that quarter, 42 per cent supported leaving the
EU in 2016. In total, around a tenth of the sample
voted to leave the EU in 2016 and were significantly
more likely to do so because of the attitudes of their
parents during their formative years.
This figure does not account for the transmission of
pro-EU attitudes from pro-EU parents to their children,
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and so the actual proportion of respondents exhibiting
congruence with the attitudes of their parents will be
higher. Nonetheless, this does show that intergenera-
tional transmission leading to a convergence of attitudes
between parents and children is only likely to occur for
that minority of the electorate who have parents with
clear and strongly held views on EU membership and/or
whose mothers were sufficiently engaged with politics
for her to ‘transmit’ them. The majority of European
citizens are unlikely to have parents with such character-
istics, and so intergenerational transmission leading to a
convergence of attitudes is probably limited to a
minority.
That said, there are other ways in which the attitudes
and values of parents during their children’s formative
years can affect their political characteristics in later
life, and which were not operationalized in this study.
The constraints of UKHLS have limited this analysis to
one particular form of intergenerational transmission,
but other research has identified other manifestations
of such transmission, such as the outright rejection of
parents’ views, or a partial or more limited transmission
(Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009; Rico and Jennings,
2012; Quintelier, Verhaegen and Hooghe, 2014;
Quintelier, 2015). Our sample could have included
respondents who, for example, were raised by extremely
Eurosceptic parents and become very supportive of EU
membership to rebel against them. It could also include
respondents who were raised by Eurosceptic parents and
were more Eurosceptic than their peers as a result, but
who nonetheless decided to support remaining in the
EU. Both such instances would not be detectable by the
method employed here. While intergenerational trans-
mission leading to convergence of Eurosceptic attitudes
between parents and children is likely to be limited to a
minority of citizens, therefore, it is likely that at least
some of our sample were influenced by their parents’
attitudes towards Europe in a manner not visible in this
analysis.
Conclusion
Since the enlargements of the 2000s that led to substan-
tial increases in migration between Member States, the
global financial crisis of 2007 and subsequent Euro cri-
sis, and the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2012, Euroscepticism has
become increasingly important in shaping public opin-
ion and politics throughout Europe. Not only are more
citizens questioning whether the benefits of EU member-
ship outweigh the costs, but the consequences of that
membership are becoming more salient for other polit-
ical concerns and values held by citizens, such as their
conceptions of national identity and culture, views of
state sovereignty, and beliefs about the role of the state.
In order to understand and explain the origins of con-
temporary public opinion and political events (such as
the victory of Lega Nord and the Five Star Movement in
Italy, the improved electoral fortunes of France’s
National Front or the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote), it
is important to understand and explain the origins of
contemporary expressions of Euroscepticism.
Our analysis is the first of its kind to use panel data
to investigate the role of familial socialization and inter-
generational transmission in the development of
Euroscepticism—simultaneously accounting for poten-
tially different effects from mothers and fathers. It pro-
vides compelling evidence that intergenerational
transmission can lead to the reproduction of parents’
attitudes amongst their children in later life. Fathers are
the most likely to transmit attitudes to their children, be-
cause that transmission is not dependent upon his level
of political engagement. Transmission from mothers, on
the other hand, is rarer because it is shaped by how
engaged she is with politics. Assuming that if a mother is
highly engaged with politics and feels strongly
Eurosceptic then she will demonstrate this clearly and
consistently during her offspring’s childhood, then there
is a strong chance that her children will share her
Eurosceptic attitude. This research suggests, therefore,
that intergenerational transmission of some form is
more likely between fathers and their children; but inter-
generational transmission resulting in congruence is
more likely between mothers and their children.
This article demonstrates the importance of family
experiences in shaping the attitudes and values that
frame an individual’s support for European integration
in later life. This suggests that the apparent rise of
Euroscepticism in recent years, and the improved elect-
oral fortunes of Eurosceptic political parties is, in part, a
result of the socialization experiences of today’s citizens:
it is not solely the result of short-term influences and
assessments about the consequences of EU membership.
Whilst rising levels of educational attainment and the
particular societal context experienced by younger gen-
erations predisposes them to be more pro-EU than their
parents and grandparents (Down and Wilson, 2013; Fox
and Pearce, 2018), this research suggests that some citi-
zens have a greater propensity to oppose the EU, or to
support Eurosceptic parties or candidates, than may
otherwise be expected. The family can be positioned,
therefore, not only as an important source of political
values and attitudes that shape modern public opinion,
but also as what Jaspers, Lubbers and De Vries (2008)
describe as a ‘buffer’ against social change: the
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experiences and values of parents, developed at an ear-
lier stage of societal development, are shared with chil-
dren and endow them with tendencies that are being
challenged or eroded by social evolution.
This study also sheds some light on the intergenera-
tional conflict that is frequently associated with
Euroscepticism. Younger generations are typically more
socially, culturally and economically liberal than their
elders, and more likely to support EU membership
(Hobolt, 2016, 2018; Curtice, 2017; Fox and Pearce,
2018). This is often identified as a source of intergenera-
tional conflict, with claims in the United Kingdom that
older generations ‘stole the futures’ of their children
common after the 2016 referendum (Abbasi, 2016;
Kottasova, 2016; Cosslet, 2016; Shuster, 2016). Such
narratives imply that views are formed in isolation and
do not account for the role of parents in shaping the atti-
tudes and values of their children. While there is un-
doubtedly a clear age divide in attitudes towards the
EU—a potential source of intergenerational conflict—
the relationship between generations in the development
of those attitudes cannot be ignored.
Finally, the constraints and limitations of this study
highlight several areas for further research. First, oppor-
tunities to explore other manifestations of intergenera-
tional transmission should be explored in order to map
processes of intergenerational transmission in shaping
the citizenry’s support for EU membership (and by asso-
ciation support for related political attitudes and cam-
paigns, such as populist political parties). This field
would also benefit from a more detailed study of how
and why transmission varies between mothers and
fathers. Future studies could consider whether different
social and economic roles (as indicated by employment
status, for example), or relationships between parents
and children, can account for this variation. Questions
also remain regarding the role of secondary socializing
agents, such as peers or schooling—both known to have
a considerable impact on the development of political
attitudes and values in ways that might complement or
challenge traits developed through parental socialization
(Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Jennings, Stoker and
Bowers, 2009). Understanding the interactions between
primary socialization processes (in the family home) and
secondary socialization processes (at school and
amongst peers), in the development of pro-European or
Eurosceptic views would be of value to policy makers in
considering potential policy interventions (such as
through education policy) that could affect the develop-
ment of Eurosceptic (and related) attitudes amongst fu-
ture generations.
Notes
1 Previous research has shown that different political
generations have differing, lasting propensities to sup-
port or oppose EU membership that persist over deca-
des, meaning that there is at least some stability to the
trait (Down and Wilson, 2013; 2017; Fox and Pearce,
2018). Lubbers and Jaspers (2010) also found such
stability in panel data, finding that no more than one
in five Dutch voters changed from being pro- to anti-
EU between 1990 and 2008. This is also apparent in
the UKHLS: respondents were asked identical ques-
tions in 1999, 2002, and 2006 about whether they
thought EU membership was bad for the United
Kingdom, whether the United Kingdom benefitted
from EU membership, and what the country’s long-
term policy towards the EU should be. The correlation
between respondents believing that EU membership
was bad for the United Kingdom between 1999 and
2006 was 0.50; for believing that the United Kingdom
did not benefit from EU membership was 0.52, and
for believing that the United Kingdom’s long term pol-
icy should be to take back power or leave the EU was
0.43. These figures are comparable to those for other
political traits well established in the literature as being
stable and relatively unchanging once an individual
passes into adulthood, such as political interest
(Plutzer, 2002), for which the correlation between
1999 and 2006 was 0.65, and party identification
(Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers, 2009), for which it
was 0.46.
2 Different ways of measuring parents’ Euroscepticism
and political engagement were tested. For the former, a
distinction was drawn between parents with ‘hard’
Eurosceptic responses to all three questions, to one or
two questions, and who gave no such responses. For
political interest, a distinction was drawn between those
who were ‘not at all’ and ‘not very’ interested in politics,
and between those who were ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ interested.
The analyses revealed that the only substantial differen-
ces were between respondents’ whose parents gave
‘hard’ Eurosceptic responses to all three questions and
those who did not, and between those whose parents
were ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ engaged with politics and those
who were not. For the sake of model parsimony, there-
fore, the simpler, dichotomous measures were used.
3 The literature also identifies national identity and
ethnicity as having important influences on
Euroscepticism (McLaren, 2002; Lubbers and
Scheepers, 2007). These were not included because
there are no measures of national identity in the rele-
vant UKHLS waves, and while there are measures of
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ethnicity, there were very few respondents from non-
white backgrounds who met the criteria for inclusion
in the sample set out above. Neither is expected,
however, to affect the findings because they are un-
likely to be related to the processes of intergenera-
tional transmission or familial socialization.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at ESR online.
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